

Building a Dynamic Reputation System for DNS

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Seminar: Large-Scale Malware Analysis

Outline

- 1 Problem Statement
- 2 Notos: A Dynamic Reputation System
 - System Overview
 - Features Extraction
 - Off-Line Mode
 - Online Mode
- 3 Performance and Observations
 - Data and Performance
 - The Good, The Bad and ...
 - Alternatives

DNS and Malicious Domains

- DNS resolves domain names into IP addresses.
- Botnets, Spyware, Fast-flux networks etc. take advantage of DNS agility.

Not as inconspicuous as they think

Typical malware behaviour includes...

- randomly generated domain names
- domains that point at *too many* IPs
- unusual utilization of network resources
- "incriminating" DNS history
- failure to comply with DNS RFCs

Static Solution: Blacklists

Not good enough

- DNS distributes DNSBLs (DNS-based Block Lists)
- Publicly available blacklists
- ... delay between creation of malicious domain and blacklisting


Dynamic Solution: Notos

- Takes advantage of typical malware behaviour
- Dynamically assigns reputation to new domains in real time

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Data Collection Infrastructure



pDNS Content

- 1 Set of domain names: $D = \{d_1, d_2, \dots, d_m\}$
- 2 Set of addresses: $A(D) = \{\text{IPs pointed by } d \mid \forall d \in D\}$
- 3 Set of IPs within a BGP prefix:
 $BGP(A) = \{\bigcup_{k=1 \dots m} BGP(a_k)\}$
- 4 Set of IPs within an AS prefix:
 $AS(A) = \{\bigcup_{k=1 \dots m} AS(a_k)\}$

pDNS Query


For a new domain d , find $A(d)$ then query pDNS for:

- 1 *Related Historic IPs (RHIPs)*: $A(d) \cup A_{3LD}(d) \cup A_{2LD}(d)$
- 2 *Related Historic Domains (RHDNs)*: all domains where $A(d_i) \cap AS(A(d)) \neq \emptyset$

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
Overview



Feature Categories

- 1 Network-based Features
- 2 Zone-based Features
- 3 Evidence-based Features

Reputation Engine



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
Off-Line Training Mode I

- ① *Network Profiles Model*: properties of benign networks ...
 - ① Popular Domains
 - ② Common Domains
 - ③ Akamai Domains (CDN)
 - ④ CDN Domains
 - ⑤ Dynamic DNS Domains

Off-Line Training Mode II

2 Domain Name Clustering:

- 1 Network-based Clustering
- 2 Zone-based Clustering



The Reputation Function

- 1 The reputation function is a statistical classifier.
- 2 labelled dataset $L = \{(v(d_i), y_i)\}$ for $d_i \in \text{Knowledge Base}$ and $y_i = 0$ if malicious, 1 otherwise.

The Reputation Function cont.

Ground Truth for malware:

- 1 public blacklists for malicious domains
- 2 Sender Policy Block (SBL) from Spamhaus
- 3 Zeus tracker

The Reputation Function cont.


Ground Truth for benign domains and networks:

- 1 top 500 alexa.com domains
- 2 18 most common 2LDs for various CDNs
- 3 464 dynamic DNS 2LDs

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The Reputation Engine



On-Line Mode

- 1 Assigns reputation scores S to new domains
- 2 $S \in [0, 1]$ where $S = 1 - f(d)$

Outline


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Data Statistics


- 27,377,461 unique resolutions collected in 68 days (July-September 2009)
- SIE collected a volume of 200 Mbit/s resolutions
- ISP DNS Servers processed 30'000 requests /s during peak hours

Performance Overview I

- overall TP 96.8% and FP 0.38%




Performance Overview II



- computing 100k networks and a 15-days pDNS DB enough for a stable number of clusters

Performance Overview III



- previously unknown Zeus botnets accurately detected

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Where Notos excels

- Identification of malicious domains weeks/months before official blacklisting
- high TP rate 98.6% and low FP rate of 0.38%
- good scalability
- equally good performance even with a smaller pDNS DB

Where it falls short

- 1 bad neighbourhoods
- 2 will not operate as well once IPv6 becomes main protocol
- 3 requires a large pDNS DB and training time
- 4 not ideal as a standalone defence system

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Alternative Dynamic Solutions

- 1 *SNARE*
- 2 *Spamscatter*
- 3 *EXPOSURE*

Sources I



<https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt>.



<https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1930.txt>.



<https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4271.txt>.



[Antonakakis M., Perdisci R., Dagon D., Lee W., Feamster N.](#)
Building a Dynamic Reputation System for DNS.